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Spatial evolution of social norms in a common-pool resource game 
 
Summary 
We study the conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool 
resource game. We consider three types of agents: cooperators, defectors and enforcers. 
The role of enforcers is to punish defectors for overharvesting the resource. Agents are 
located around a circle and they only observe the actions of their two nearest neighbors. 
Their payoffs are determined by both local and global interactions and they modify their 
actions by imitating the strategy in their neighborhood with the highest payoffs on 
average. Using theoretical and numerical analysis, we find that a large diversity of 
equilibria exists in this game. In particular, we derive conditions for the occurrence of 
equilibria in which the three strategies coexist. We also discuss the stability of these 
equilibria. Finally, we show that introducing resource dynamics favors the occurrence 
of cooperative equilibria. 
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The common-pool resource (CPR) game is an excellent vehicle to study social dilemmas. A
social dilemma is a situation in which the pursuit of individual interest comes at the expense of
the collective goals. In the context of the management of common-pool resources, such a social
dilemma results in overexploitation and ineciency compared to the Pareto optimum.
Are people's actions always governed by selsh behavior? Recent evidence has led economists
to reconsider their assumptions on behavior. In practice, a certain proportion of the population
often exhibits cooperative behavior that seems in contradiction with a rational, selsh agent
perspective. Such behavior is especially common when social norms prevail. These can operate
in a decentralized way through a system of mutual trust, reward or punishment.
Ostrom (1990) collected a large range of case studies of rural communities in which the
presence of social norms led to sustainable management of common-pool resources. An example
that has received much attention is the lobster industry in Maine. In this community, shermen
were assigned a spatial territory to spread their traps. In order to increase their catch, free-
riders tried to expand their territory. Every sherman, however, was allowed to defend his
territory using dierent degrees of sanctions ranging from reprimands to opening or destroying
the traps of the free-riders (Acheson, 1988). In other settings, ceasing cooperation with rather
than punishment of free-riders has also proved eective. For example, Japanese villagers, Irish
shermen and inhabitants of the Solomon islands chose to cut contact with other members of
the community who were overshing (McKean, 1992; Taylor, 1987; Hviding and Baines, 1994).
In this way, free-riders are deprived from the benets provided by cooperation in other economic
activities.
Next to case studies, there is also a large variety of experimental evidence that supports
the persistence of cooperation. This literature is too large to be reviewed here. Seminal work
has been done by Ostrom et al. (1994) and Fehr and G achter (2001). The latter study shows
that often a small proportion of `altruistic punishers' in the population is sucient to enforce
cooperation in the group. Van Soest and Vyrastekova (2004) provide an application in the eld
of renewable resourcess.
A key question is: Why does cooperative behavior emerge in the rst place? Compared to
the real world evidence there is not so much theory on this subject. Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
develop a theoretical model of inequity aversion. They assume that a small proportion of
people is willing to sacrice material payos if this leads to more `fair' and equitable outcomes.
Sethi and Somanathan (1996) discuss the view expressed by Dasgupta (1993), who oers three
possible explanations.
21. Small communities can be considered as mini states with the capacity to force members
of the community to accept rules of behavior. Sethi and Somanathan (1996) do not nd
this a strong argument, because it cannot explain the fact that sanctioning by private
individuals can be spontaneous and entail destructive actions that are often prohibited at
the state level.
2. Rationality in a repeated game can be reconciled with cooperation. This is the well-known
Folk theorem. But the problem here is of course that the set of potential equilibrium
outcomes is very large and that alternating periods of cooperation and defection can
arise, contradicting observed persistence of strategies.
3. Social norms are internalized. They can then thus motivate agents to do what they do.
To address the problem associated with explanation 2 and analyse the solution oered under
3, adopting an evolutionary game setting is a promising option. By tracing the evolution of
cooperation (and defection) it can help to determine which hypothetical equilibria with or
without cooperation are actually feasible from a dynamic population perspective.
Theoretical models to explain or analyse the role of social norms to sustain cooperation
in a resource setting are rare. Sethi and Somanathan (1996) aim to analyse which norms,
as mentioned under point 3 above, can be internalized, using an evolutionary game theoretic
framework. In their model, agents can choose between three strategies: defection, cooperation
or enforcement. Agents who choose to be enforcer punish defectors, even though they incur a
cost for doing so. The sanction level and the cost of sanctioning borne by defectors and enforcers
depends on the number of defectors and enforcers in the population. Payos are related to the
size of the resource stock and, for defectors (and enforcers), to the level of sanction (punishing)
cost level. The agents can modify their strategy over time through a process of social learning.
They learn by imitating the strategy that yields above average prots in the population. This is
modeled by a replicator dynamics that mimics the evolution of social norms in the population.
Sethi and Somanathan identify two main equilibria: namely a population composed of only
defectors and a population composed of only cooperators and enforcers.
Another theoretical study of the role of social norms in solving social dilemmas is Eshel et
al. (1998), who consider a model of local interactions between altruistic and egoistic agents.
Although they do not deal with a resource, they nevertheless suggest relevant elements for
our approach. In the rst place, they assume that agents imitate the strategy in their The
neighborhood with the highest average prot. Second, they are able to derive analytical results
for a setting in which agents are spatially distributed aroundon a circle and interact only with
their two nearest neighbors.
3In the present paper, we consider a spatial evolutionary CPR game that combines both
local and global interactions. Agents can be cooperators, defectors or enforcers, and imitate
the strategy yielding above average payos in their neighborhood. We model space just like
in Eshel et al. (1998) by assuming a circle with agents that only observe their two nearest
neighbors. This is a logical conceptual-analytical starting point, and it also provides a quite
accurate picture of how interactions occur in a large range of CPR issues, notably irrigation
problems. Indeed, in many rural communities experiencing water con
icts, the monitoring of
water quotas is exerted by the farmer located upstream or downstream of the water 
ow (see
Ostrom, 1990; Smith, 2000), suggesting a linear or circular (to avoid edge problems) model.
In line with this, we assume in our model that enforcers can only punish defectors located
in their immediate neighborhood, which implies local interaction. Payos further depend on
the aggregate harvesting eort and on the evolution of the stock of the resource, which means
global interactions. We derive theoretical and numerical results on the type of equilibria that
emerge in such a system. We nd two main innovative results compared to previous work.
First, equilibria in which the three types of strategies coexist survive in the long-run. Second,
the emergence of such equilibria, and of cooperative equilibria in general, is facilitated when
resource dynamics are introduced.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the standard CPR game and its
evolutionary version. Section 3 sets out the main results obtained with our model for the case
without resource dynamics. We discuss stability of equilibria in Section 4. Section 5 presents
the results with resource dynamics. Section 6 concludes.
2 The CPR game
We consider the performance of three types of agents: cooperators, defectors and enforcers.
They play a game that involves the exploitation of a common pool of a renewable natural
resource. Cooperators and enforcers are supposed to display social behavior, meaning that they
restrict the level of harvesting eort exercised. Defectors, however, are only interested in their
own prots, and harvest with a relatively high eort level, thereby possibly harming the other
players. In order to be more precise with regard to these concepts we introduce here brie
y the
standard CPR game as a benchmark (see e.g., Dasgupta and Heal, 1979; Chichilnisky, 1994; or
Ostrom et al.,1994). We consider rst the case of no resource dynamics. Subsequently we discuss
the case where the natural resource changes over time. Then we introduce the evolutionary CPR
game.
42.1 The standard CPR game
A xed population of n (n > 1) agents has access to a common pool of resources. Initially, we
assume that the size of the pool is constant over time. The exploitation of the resource leads
to harvest. The individual eort level of agent i is denoted by xi (i = 1;:::;n). The individual





Harvest depends on individual as well as aggregate eort. When aggregate eort is X total
harvest is equal to F(X): It is assumed that F is strictly concave and increasing, F(0) = 0,
F0(0) > w, and F 0(1) < w. The harvested commodity is taken as the numeraire. Each agent










i(xi;X) = F(X)   wX: (3)
The Pareto ecient, aggregate prot maximizing level of eort is dened by F 0(XP) = w:
The zero prot level of eorts is dened by F(XO) = wXO. The symmetric Nash equilibrium








F0(XC) = w (4)
Clearly X0 > XC > XP. So, the Nash equilibrium is suboptimal, but yields positive rents.
In the case of resource dynamics the social optimum can be described in several ways. One






_ N(t) = G(N(t))   F(X(t);N(t));N(0) = N0
Here r is the social discount rate, N(t) denotes the resource stock at time t; G is the natural
growth function, and F is the harvest function, increasing in aggregate eort as well as in the
existing stock. Social behavior can then be dened as consistent with a dynamic extraction
5path that follows from present value maximization. The Nash equilibrium is the solution to the
dierential game where each agent takes the time path of eorts of all other players as given
and maximizes his own total discounted prots.
2.2 The evolutionary CPR game
In the evolutionary CPR game a distinction is made between cooperators, defectors and en-
forcers. Defectors do not behave according to the social norm, and may be punished by en-
forcers. We rst introduce the set of strategies. Next, we discuss the payos. Then, we go into
the spatial structure of the game. Finally, we introduce replicator dynamics.
2.2.1 Strategies
In our evolutionary framework agents have a xed strategy that may not be based on perfect
rationality, but that we assume to be in line with our common understanding of the agents'
characteristics. The individual eort by cooperators and enforcers is denoted by xL and the
eort by individual defectors is xH:
For the case of no resource dynamics it is assumed that these eort rates are constant and
satisfy
XP  nxL < nxH: (5)
Hence, if all players (n) are cooperators or enforcers they end up more closely to the Pareto
ecient outcome than when all players are defectors. 1
For the case of resource dynamics there are several plausible ways of modeling eort by
individual agents. As suggested above, cooperation can be modeled by assuming that if all
agents were cooperators, they would mimic the present value maximizing extraction path. A
feature common to evolutionary approaches, however, is that agents use rules of thumb rather
than adopt individually or socially optimal strategies. One way to capture this is to assume
that eort rates of agents are constants, that may, however, dier across types of agents. For
example, the individual eort of cooperators and enforcers is xL with nxL close to Xpv; dened
as the steady state eort of the present value maximizing program, whereas eort by defectors
is larger: xH > xL: If nxL = Xpv and all agents are cooperators, convergence to the present
value optimal steady state ocurs. An alternative approach allows for the strategy to depend on
the existing stock, in line with the work of Sethi and Somanathan (1996). There it is assumed
that all players can observe the existing resource stock, or are informed about the stock by an
agency. Then one can dene xL(t) = LN(t) and xH(t) = HN(t) with L and H positive
1One could be more specic by assuming for example that XP = nxL < XC  nxH  X0: But for our
purposes this simple representation suces.
6constants with H > L. In particular, L can be chosen such that convergence occurs to
Npv; the present value maximizing steady state resource stock. It need not be the case that
the socially optimal steady state coincides with the steady state arising from present value
maximization. Other objectives than present value maximization can be pursued as well.
2.2.2 Payos
The numbers of cooperators, defectors and enforcers are denoted by nC;nD and nE; respectively.
Cooperators and enforcers all exercise an eort level of xL(N) (obviously the argument N can be
suppressed when resource dynamics is not taken into account) each. Enforcers punish defectors,
at a cost 
 per detected defector. Defectors exercise an eort xH(N) and pay a sanction  per
enforcer that detects them. Dene Z(X;N) = F(X;N)=X   w, which can be interpreted as
aggregate prot per unit of eort. Individual prots, payo, can be written as follows.
C(X;N) = xL(N)Z(X;N) (6)
D
k (X;N) = xH(N)Z(X;N)   k (7)
E
m(X;N) = xL(N)Z(X;N)   
m (8)
Here D
k (X;N) denotes the prots of a defector punished k times and E
m(X;N) is the payo
of an enforcer punishing m times.
2.2.3 Spatial structure
Sethi and Somanathan (1996) assume that all enforcers in the population can detect all defectors
and punish them. Formally, that means that k = nE and m = nD: Obviously, the spatial
structure is irrelevant then. In contrast, we assume that an enforcer can only detect and punish
a defector in his immediate neighborhood. This calls for a denition of neighborhood. There
are several straightforward ways to do so. Eshel et al. (1998) describe players as located on
a circle, implying that every agent has exactly two direct neighbors. Hence k and m take the
values 0;1; or 2: One could extend the notion of neighborhood to two positions on the circle at
each side. Then k and m run from 0 to 4: Another convenient way of dening neighborhood
is on a torus. A torus is a two dimensional lattice whose corners are pasted together to ensure
that all cells are connected, so that there are no edge eects. Then an agent's neighbors are,
for example, those to the west, east, north and south. In that case k and m run from 0 to 4.
One could include also those to the north-east etc., at the cost of higher complexity. In the
present paper we focus on the circle with each agent having two neighbors, because this allows
us to derive interesting theoretical results that are much more dicult to obtain for the torus.
7For an extensive numerical analysis on the two-dimensional torus, using a dierent learning
rule as well, we refer to Noailly et al. (2004). The sanctioning cost falling upon an enforcer
is proportional to the number of defectors detected and punished, which expresses the eorts
made by the enforcer. Similarly, in our setup it matters by how many enforcers a defector is
detected. In the case of two enforcers, the cost to the defector is twice as high as in the case
of only one enforcer. This can be regarded either as re
ecting the sum of the damages in
icted
upon the defector by individual enforcers or as the level of punishment being dependent on the
amount of evidence provided by all enforcers together.
2.2.4 Replicator dynamics.
A common element of evolutionary game theory is replicator dynamics, describing when, how
and why agents switch strategies. In Sethi and Somanathan (1996) agents are assumed to
be able to observe their own prots and the average prots in the population. The decision
to change strategy is based on the comparison of these prots. In particular the replicator
dynamics is described by:
_ nj = nj(j   ) j = C;D;E (9)
where  = (nCC + nDD + nEE)=n; the average payo in the entire population at time
t: Therefore, agents do not necessarily switch to the most protable strategy instantaneously.
It follows that an equilibrium with all three strategies, a so-called CDE equilibrium (with Co-
operators, Defectors and Enforcers) will never prevail, because in such an equilibrium enforcers
would do strictly worse than cooperators. In contrast to Sethi and Somanathan we explicitly
take into account that agents do not observe the payos of the entire population. We make
the more realistic assumption that agents only observe the payos of all agents in their neigh-
borhood, including themselves. The aggregate replicator dynamics formulation then has to be
dropped. Several alternative imitation or selection mechanisms can be adopted. One is that an
agent imitates the strategy in his neighborhood with the highest payo. The advantage of this
rule is its simplicity. But it can lead to outcomes that might be considered implausible. Take
for example the case where a cooperator is surrounded by two defectors, one not being punished
(and better o than the cooperator) and the other one severely punished, paying a very high
sanction. In such a case it might not be considered very plausible for the cooperator to switch
to defection. On the torus, with a cooperator surrounded by three defectors, one of which is not
punished and the other three severely punished, the example might even be more appealing.
However, there are no fundamental objections against modeling the imitation dynamics this
8way. An alternative approach is to switch to the strategy that is doing best on average in the
neighborhood. This implies a certain degree of rationality on behalf of the agent. Applying
this rule to the previous example, the cooperator becomes a defector if on average the defectors
in the cooperator's neighborhood do better than the cooperator. This is the rule employed by
Eshel et al. (1998) and we will use it the present paper too.
3 No resource dynamics
This section deals with the case where resource dynamics is not taken into account. Conse-
quently, the variable N; denoting the resource stock, is suppressed throughout this section.
At any instant of time  the system is characterized by the number of agents of each type,
nC();nD() and nE(); summing up to the given number n and by the location of each agent
on the circle. For convenience, we x one position on the circle and call it position 1:Then a
state of the system can be represented by a vector of length n consisting of ordered C 0s, D0s and
E0s: So, with n = 5, the notation CDEDE means that there is a cooperating agent at position
1, there are defectors at positions 2 and 4; and enforcers at positions 3 and 5 (note, however,
that this state is essentially the same as DEDEC). Time is considered discrete. At time  +1
the system nds itself in a new state, as a consequence of agents switching from one strategy
to another. In rst instance strategy changes occur only on the basis of replicator dynamics.
Mutation is studied in section 4. The questions we address in the present concern the limiting
behavior of the system, as  goes to innity.
We have been able to identify a rich set of limit states. First of all there are equilibria. A
state is called an equilibrium if no agents want to change strategy. Second, there are blinkers.
A state is called a blinker if there are agents that change strategy, but the new resulting state is
a rotation of the original state. For example: the state characterized by CDEED is a blinker,
if, after all agents have made their choice of strategy, the new state is DCDEE: So, essentially
neither the numbers of cooperators, defectors and enforcers, nor their relative positions on the
circle have changed. We also found cycling with period 1, where composition of the population
of strategies as well as locations change over time, but where after one period the system
reproduces.
As shown by the prot equations given in the previous section, payos are aected by both
local and global factors, namely sanctioning among neighbors and aggregate eorts, respectively.
The combination of these two types of factors is an innovative feature of the present paper.
However, it entails the inconvenience to render the model much more complex to analyse.
Under some assumptions with regard to the ranking of prots, general theoretical results can
9be derived for equilibria and blinking. With regard to cycling we restrict ourselves to providing
an example to show that it can actually occur.
3.1 Equilibria and blinkers
We aim to derive conditions for the existence of certain types of equilibria and blinkers. Prot
rankings are not unambiguous: E
1 (X) < D
1 (X) for some values of X and E
1 (X) > D
1 (X)
for other values. This complicates a theoretical analysis and makes it dicult to obtain clear-
cut results. Therefore, we concentrate on unambiguous prot rankings here. We also want to
neglect the case of negative prots. This rules out the possibility that defectors do worse than
cooperators even if they are not punished. To avoid clutter we omit the argument X when
there is no danger of confusion. For example, D
0 > C means D
0 (X) > C(X) for all relevant
X (i.e., nxL  X  nxH):
Prots from harvesting are nonnegative if Z(nxH)  0, because Z is decreasing and X 
nxH: An immediate consequence is that D
0 > C = E







2 : Still many rankings are possible. One could choose the sanction rate 
very low relative to the cost of sanctioning 
. That would imply that D
2 > E
0 : An immediate
consequence of this inequality holding is that only defectors survive. Such an extreme case
is not particularly interesting neither from an analytical nor from a practical point of view.
Therefore, we assume that C > D
1 ; which is achieved if and only if xHZ    < xLZ: A
sucient condition for this to hold is that (xH  xL)Z(nxH) < . Moreover, we want sanctions











2 . Therefore, if being punished once is better than punishing once, then
being punished twice is worse than punishing twice, and vice versa. Hence, in the former case,
being a defector is not too advantageous. These assumptions allow for a theoretical approach.
The simulations that follow in the next section suggest that the results we obtain analytically
also hold for a much broader class of parameter values.
Since the imitation rule that we employ is based on comparison of average payos, an
additional distinction can be made. A defector punished once is doing better than an enforcer
punishing once, and having a non-punishing enforcer in his neighborhood, or this ranking is the
other way around. To illustrate the intuition, consider the following complete string EEEDD,
so with the second defector next to the rst enforcer. The rst and the third enforcers, both
next to a defector punished once, change to defection when the sanction rate is suciently low.
However, with a moderately low sanction rate both defectors become enforcers.
Quite naturally, these considerations lead to the following three orderings.
Denition 1
10i. The sanction rate is relatively low if: D






ii. The sanction rate is relatively very low if: D











iii. The sanction rate is relatively moderately low if : D











iv. The sanction rate is relatively high if: D






So, the sanction rate is relatively low if D
k > E
k for k = 1;2: It is relatively high if D
k < E
k
for k = 1;2: It should be noted that the wording, including 'relatively', is chosen on purpose.
For example, the sanction rate could be called absolutely low if D
2 > E
1 ; or even D
2 > E
0 .
We will consider such cases later on in this paper when performing simulations.
Below we derive a set of sucient conditions for each of the two rankings to hold, thereby
showing that the denitions are not void.
Lemma 1
i. Suppose 
 >  and (xH   xL)Z(nxL) < 2   
. Then the sanction rate is relatively low.
ii. Suppose 
 > , and    1
2
 < (xH  xL)Z(nxH) < (xH  xL)Z(nxL) < 2  
: Then the
sanction rate is relatively very low.
iii. Suppose 
 >  and (xH   xL)Z(nxL) <    1
2
: Then the sanction rate is relatively
moderately low.
iv. Suppose (xH   xL)Z(nxL) <    
 and (xH   xL)Z(nxH) >    2
: Then the sanction
rate is relatively high.
Proof
The proof the lemma is given in the appendix.
The proof of the lemma is rather technical, but the idea behind it is easily explained, for
example, for part i. If the cost of sanctioning 
 is higher than the sanction ; then a defector
being punished k times is better o than an enforcer punishing k times for all k, because
prots from harvesting are higher for a defector, and the defector incurs a lower sanction than
the cost the enforcer has to make to punish. Moreover, if (xH   xL)Z(nxL) < 2   
; then
xHZ(X)   2 < xLZ(X)   
 < 0 for all X  nxH and hence E
1 > D
2 . All the other proofs
follow the same approach.
An further distinction suggests itself: a relatively very high versus a moderately high sanction
rate, according to 1
2(D
0 + D
1 ) being smaller or larger than E
1 ; respectively. However, this
distinction is not meaningful, as can be seen as follows. The inequality 1
2(D
0 + D
1 ) < E
1 ,
requires (xH  xL)Z(X) < 1
2  
 for all X  nxH, so that it is necessary that 1
2  
 > 0: But
the inequality D
1 > E
2 requires (xH  xL)Z(X) >   2
 = 2(1
2  
): This is a contradiction.
11Also, note that the relatively high sanction rate implicitly assumes that  > 
; since (xH  
xL)Z(nxL) > 0:
Next we establish several propositions regarding the existence and the characteristics of
equilibria and blinkers, assuming that the prot ranking satises one of the denitions given
above. States with only cooperators ('allC'), only defectors ('allD'), only enforcers ('allE'), and
only cooperators and enforcers ('CE'), are always an equilibrium. A state with only defectors
and cooperators ('CD') cannot be an equilibrium, because then a cooperator next to a defector
will change to defection. Therefore, we concentrate on the DE and CDE equilibria. A cluster
in an equilibrium is a string of adjacent agents playing identical strategies. To start with we
prove a lemma that turns out to be rather helpful.
Lemma 2.
Suppose n  3.
i. A string composed as CED cannot occur in an equilibrium.
ii. A string composed as CD cannot occur in an equilibrium.
iii. A string composed as DED cannot occur in an equilibrium.
iv. A string composed as EDE cannot occur in an equilibrium.
Proof
i. With CED; the punishing enforcer switches to cooperation, if not to defection.
ii. With CD the defector switches to cooperation or the other way around.
iii. and iv. Obviously, DED cannot occur under a relatively low sanction rate, and EDE is
ruled out in the case of a relatively high sanction rate. If DED would occur in an equilibrium
with a relatively high sanction rate, the defectors surrounding the enforcer would not be pun-
ished twice, since EDE is ruled out. But then the enforcer switches to defection. To exclude
EDE in the relatively low sanction case, the same type of argument holds.
Proposition 1
Suppose the sanction rate is relatively very low.
i. There exists neither a DE nor a CDE equilibrium.
ii. There exists neither a DE nor a CDE blinker.
Proof
i. Suppose there exists an equilibrium with nE > 0 and nD > 0: There must be at least one
enforcer next to a defector, because the equilibrium does not consist of defectors only, and if a
defector is not punished, he cannot be a neighbor of a cooperator, because then the cooperator
switches to defection. If a defector next to an enforcer is punished only once the enforcer will




1 ); a contradiction. Hence every defector is punished
twice, contradicting lemma 3iv.
ii. Suppose there is a blinker with nE > 0 and nD > 0: At least one agent switches to
enforcement. This is not a cooperator. So, a defector should switch to enforcement. He will
only do so if he is punished twice: so we have EDE. In order for the rst enforcer in this string
to switch to defection, we need DEDE, because with EEDE he will stay an enforcer. But
now the rst defector in the row will never switch to enforcement. This proves part ii of the
proposition.
Proposition 2
Suppose the sanction rate is relatively moderately low.
i. For a DE-equilibrium to obtain it is necessary that n  5: If n = 5 the equilibrium
conguration is given by EEEDD. In any DE-equilibrium enforcers occur in clusters of minimal
length 3.
ii. For a CDE-equilibrium to obtain it is necessary that n  9. If n = 9 the equilibrium
conguration is given by CEEEDDEEE. In any CDE equilibrium any enforcer adjacent to a
defector is part of a cluster of at least 3 enforcers.
iii. There exists neither a DE nor a CDE blinker.
Proof
The proof of the proposition is given in the appendix.






1 ); punishing enforcers need to be 'protected' by non-punishing enforcers. This leads to
clusters of three enforcers. Protection by cooperators does not work, because, in an equilibrium,
a punishing enforcer can never be located next to a cooperator. This is also an informal
explanation of the minimal number of players needed. This minimal number is an absolute
one. Obviously, it might be the case that that in a CDE-equilibrium the majority of agents is
defecting.
Proposition 3.
Suppose the sanction rate is relatively high.
i. For a DE-equilibrium to obtain it is necessary that n  5: If n = 5 the equilibrium con-
guration is given by EEDDD. In any DE-equilibrium defectors occur in clusters of minimal
length 3.
ii. For a CDE-equilibrium to obtain it is necessary that n  8. If n = 8; the equilibrium
conguration is given by CEEDDDEE. In any CDE equilibrium any defector adjacent to an
enforcer is part of a cluster of at least 3 defectors.
13iii. There exist no DE blinkers. There do exist CDE blinkers. A necessary condition is
n  4: If n = 4; the blinker is CDDE.
Proof
i. and ii. The proof of parts i. and ii follows the lines of the proof of the previous proposition.
It will not be given here.
iii. Non-existence of DE blinkers is obvious. Suppose n = 3 and there is a CDE blinker.
Then the cooperator remains a cooperator. Both the enforcer and the defector turn into coop-
erators. Hence there is no blinking in this case. Suppose n = 4. In a CDE blinker a cooperator
never becomes an enforcer. Hence, at least one cooperator should turn into a defector. This
can only be the case if he is next to a defector who is not punished. In the present case we can-
not have CDCE because both cooperators will become defectors. Hence the only equilibrium
candidate is CDDE. It is easily veried that this is a blinking equilibrium.
3.2 Cycling
To illustrate the phenomenon of cycling in the present setting, consider the following initial
state: DDDDEE: The defectors in positions 2 and 3 will not change strategy. The rst and
fourth defector change strategy if the average payo of the defectors in their neighborhood is




0 (X) + D
1 (X)] < E
1 (X) (10)
If this inequality holds, for X = 2xL + 4xH; the enforcers stick to enforcement since then
also
D
1 (X) < E
1 (X) (11)
Therefore, if (11) holds, the new state becomes EDDEEE: The enforcers at positions 1 and 6




0 (X) + E
1 (X)] < D
1 (X) (12)
for X = 4xL + 2xH: When this condition holds, the defectors stay defectors. Now take
xL = 100; xH = 120; F(X) = 13:25X1=2, w = 0:5; 
 = 0:1;  = 0:5428: Then all conditions
are satised. Therefore, cycling between the two states indicated above occurs with a period of
one. It may be noticed that the range of the sanction , given the other parameter values, is
rather small. This small range is also found in various other numerical examples with dierent
parameter values for xL, xH and the parameters of F, to the extent that initially it turned
out to be quite dicult even to nd an example of cycling. It suggests that cycling does not
14occur for a wide range of parameter values. Obviously, that does not matter, since the aim was
just to provide an example. Moreover, it would be relatively easy to induce cycling if we allow
prots from harvesting to be negative: Z(X) < 0: In that case the incentive to change strategy
is much larger for defectors , because they earn less from harvesting than enforcers (they incur
greater losses). In our example we took care that prots, even including sanctions and the cost
of sanctioning, are positive. The importance of the example is that it shows that the system is
not only steered through local interaction, but that global interaction through aggregate eorts
plays a role too.
Comparing the results in this section with those obtained by Sethi and Somanathan, we
observe that we not only have more types of limit states (cycling, blinking and equilibria), but
within the class of equilibria, we have equilibria with cooperation surviving next to defection,
which is novel as well. This phenomenon occurs for sanction levels that can be deemed realistic.
So, it turns out that the spatial structure of the game is pivotal in the characterization of
potential equilibria.
4 Stability
In the previous section we have established the existence of equilibria where cooperators survive
in groups with many defectors. This is a result that is due to the spatial structure of our model.
It would less interesting as a result if the occurrence of these equilibria would merely be a
coincidence, namely for very specic spatial constellations, or if the equilibria would easily be
disrupted by players making mistakes in choosing their strategies. In the present section we
investigate this issue. We rst go into the possibilities oered by evolutionary game theory. Then
we discuss and explore an alternative route, relying on numerical simulations with stochastic
features.
In evolutionary game theory stability of equilibria is tied to mutation, meaning that players
may make mistakes in deciding on their strategy. This then leads to the notion of stochastic
stability. Before dealing with stochastic stability in detail we illustrate the concept by means
of an example. Suppose we start in a conguration of only cooperators. This conguration will
persist if all players follow the imitation rule. However, suppose that each player has a given
small probability of making a mistake. At some instant of time this probability materializes and
a player becomes a defector. Then defection will infect a large part of the population within
nite time: many cooperators will be eradicated. And it is highly unlikely that the stochastic
process of mutation will restore the 'allC' equilibrium. This is essentially why this equilibrium
is not stochastically stable.
15One way to assess the stochastic stability or instability of equilibria is outlined in Young
(1998) and in Eshel et al. (1998). We brie
y sketch the procedure, merely to illustrate the
diculties encountered in its application. As was stated before, at any instant of time  the
state of the system is characterized by the number of agents of each type, nC();nD() and
nE(); summing up to the given number of agents n, and by the location of each agent on the
circle. Such a representation may be misleading, however. If two states are identical up to
rotation or taking the mirror image, they should be considered as identical states. For example:
the state CCDDEEE is the same as CDDEEEC (each player is moved one position) and
as EEEDDCC (we 'read' the circle in the opposite direction). So, in the sequel, we restrict
ourselves to unique states. The state space is the nite set of all possible states. The matrix P
of transition probabilities pij from state i to state j, is completely determined by the imitation
dynamics. To keep things simple, we assume that a situation where a player has two equivalent
strategies to choose from does not occur. Then the transition matrix consists of zeros and
ones only. Next, we introduce mutation. After the transition to a new state a player has a
probability 1
2 of not adopting the strategy that is optimal according to the imitation rule, but,
instead, going to pursue either of the two alternative strategies. So, a player who just became a
cooperator, according to the imitation rule, will actually act as a defector or an enforcer, each
with probability 1
2. This yields another matrix of probabilities denoted by Q with a typical
element qij denoting the probability of transition from state i to state j, as a consequence of




k pikqkj: Let  be the solution of the following system   = ; where  is on the unit
simplex:   0 and
P
i i = 1: The vector  is the unique stationary distribution of the process
for a given mutation rate. Element i indicates that as time gets large, state i will occur during
a proportion i of time. Finally, one considers the limit of  for the mutation rate approaching
zero.
It is clear from the exposition given above that in the case at hand it is almost unsur-
mountable to derive general results on the stochastic stability of CDE equilibria in our model.
Already for the minimal number of agents in the low sanction case the set of possible states
amounts to hundreds. Eshel et al. (1998) were able to derive results on stochastic stability,
thanks to the fact that their analysis only involves two strategies. And Sethi and Somanathan
(1996) do not inquire into stochastic stability, arguing that: "Given the timescales relevant
for this paper, the introduction of stochastic perturbations is therefore unlikely to aect our
main inferences". Like in the case of Sethi and Somanathan, one can consider our model as
applying to sheries. The timescales can be interpreted as referring to seasons, while updating
occurs once per season. If an equilibrium would not persist after, say, 1000 seasons, then this
16should not be considered as a sign of instability because it concerns an extremely long time
horizon for the system considered. In other words, if it takes thousands of seasons and thus
years before a certain type of equilibrium (e.g., CDE) has completely vanished, then from a
practical perspective this should not be regarded as a serious case of instability. Indeed, many
other, directed factors will then have ample time to exercise their in
uence on the system and
its stability, negating the relevance of the stochastic factors.
We investigate stability of the dierent equilibria, and in particular of CDE-equilibria,
using numerical simulations. We employ the harvest function given by F(N;X) = N 1=2X1=2
and consider a population of n = 100 agents. The other parameter values are
w = 5; N0 = 106 (13)
xH = 120; xL = 100 (14)
 = 280; 
 = 300 (15)
These parameters are chosen such that nxL = XP, implying that when all agents harvest low the
social optimum is reached. Further, we have Z(nxH) > 0, so that in the absence of sanctioning
all players enjoy positive prots.
In a rst step, we illustrate the above statement of Sethi and Somanathan (1996) by studying
the timescales on which cooperative equilibria cease to occur. We start from a xed spatial
conguration, namely a CDE initial state with nC = 25, nD = 25 and nE = 50. The agents are
positioned in the following order: 25 cooperators, 25 enforcers, 25 defectors and 25 enforcers.
In the absence of mutation and with  = 280, this initial state leads to a CDE equilibrium.How
does the frequency of CDE equilibria evolve when we introduce mutations? We assume that
in every round each agent has a probability of making a mistake of  = 5=1000, meaning that,
at the beginning of every round, the agent has a chance of  to deviate from the decision rule.
We record the population conguration at the end of every round. We conduct 100 simulation
runs for dierent time horizons and compute the average time spent in each possible population
conguration. The results are reported in Table 1
[Insert table 1 about here]
After 10000 rounds, the system spent on average 24% of the time in a CDE conguration.
As expected, as the time horizon increases, i.e., as the number of mutations rises, the frequency
of CDE equilibria decreases. Eventually, as  ! 1, the frequency will be close to zero.
Nevertheless, this frequency decreases by only 1% per additional 10000 rounds. After 30000
rounds, the system spends still 22% of the time in a CDE equilibrium. This suggests that
the timescales over which CDE disappears are very long and irrelevant for applications with
17seasonal updating. Note also that the mutation rate is kept constant in this experiment, whereas
it should converge in a proper test for stochastic stability.
Our approach with spatial interaction lends itself to examine stability of equilibria in an
alternative manner, namely to look at the emergence of equilibria and the frequency of the
dierent types of equilibria when we randomize over the initial shares of strategies as well as
their distribution over the circle. For a given sanction rate , we vary:
1. the initial shares of each strategy in the population. To reduce the number of runs neces-
sary to cover all the possible combinations of initial shares, only strategy shares that are
multiples of 0.05 are considered.The set of initial coordinates Z = ((1;0;0);(0:95;0:05;0)
:::(0;0;1)) is composed of coordinates z0 = (nC=n;nD=n;nE=n): Further, we eliminate
initial strategy shares composed of only cooperators and defectors, and of only coopera-
tors and enforcers, as the outcomes can be easily predicted in these cases.2 This leaves
us with 190 potential initial shares
2. the initial spatial distribution of strategies. For every z0, we perform 100 so-called runs of
200 time-steps3. Each run starts with a draw from a uniform random spatial distribution,
such that the probability of a position on the circle being occupied by a player of type j
equals nj=n (j = C;D;E). This means that for each z0, we consider 100 random spatial
arrangements and registered the resulting equilibrium.
We nd that on average 32% of the runs (out of 19000) converge to a D-equilibrium, 4%
converge to a CE-equilibrium, 33% to a DE-equibrium and 29% to a CDE-equilibrium. Cycling
occurred in the CDE-conguration in 2% of the cases. We found no occurrence of blinker
states. This is in line with our theoretical results since the sanction level  = 280 corresponds
to a relatively moderately low sanction rate. What can we conclude from the fact that in almost
30% of the cases convergence to a CDE-equilibrium occurs? Formally, it does not prove the
stochastic stability of this type of equilibrium. But the procedure followed does suggest that
CDE-equilibria are not a mere coincidence. In an environment that is stochastic with respect
to initial shares and initial locations, cooperation will survive in a large number of cases.
Additionally, these simulations provide two other types of insights on how the system works.
First, we gain insights on how the initial distribution aects equilibria. Figure 1 shows the
frequency of convergence to each equilibrium for the dierent initial shares combinations. In
2When there are no enforcers in the population, defectors always earn more than cooperators and will spread
quickly through the population. When there are no defectors in the population, cooperators and enforcers earn
the same payos and stick to their strategies so that there is no further evolution of strategies.
3Convergence to equilibria always occurred within 200 time steps
18each graph, each z0 is represented by a dot. The grey-black scale indicates the result of 100
random spatial distributions after 200 time steps. A black colored coordinate indicates that,
starting with the respective z0, all runs converge to the given type of equilibrium.4
[Insert gure 1 about here]
As expected, D-equilibria are more easily achieved for initial populations with few enforcers
and, inversely, CE-equilibria are more likely to be reached for initial populations composed of
many enforcers. CDE-equilibria are most frequently achieved for middle-range initial shares
with a slight majority of enforcers.
Second, we gain insights on the eects of the initial location of strategies over space. Figure
2 shows the evolution of strategy shares over time starting from three identical share vectors
z0 = (0:30;0:30;0:40) but with dierent initial spatial arrangements. The evolution of strat-
egy shares is governed by two forces. First, enforcers who punish a lot imitate defectors in
their neighborhood. In some sense, enforcers are eliminated by defectors. Second, enforcers
who punish at least one defector switch to cooperation when cooperators are located in their
neighborhood. So, we see that enforcers have a hard life. On the other hand, they eliminate de-
fectors if they punish hard enough. In all of the approach paths we see the number of enforcers
decreases; the number of defectors increases in the nal steps.
[Insert gure 2 about here]
Finally, to complete our analysis of stability and to conrm further that the occurrence
of CDE-equilibria is not a mere coincidence, we run simulations for various sanction levels.
Given our parameter values, the denition of a relatively very low sanction is satised for
200 <  < 232: The sanction rate is relatively moderately low if 232 <  < 341: It is relatively
high if 400 <  < 680: We also performed simulations for sanction rates outside the ranges
that imply an unambiguous ordering of prots. For each sanction level, we performed 19000
simulation runs and computed the average frequence of occurrence of each equilibrium. The
results are displayed in Figure 3. The exact frequencies for each type of equilibrium can be
found in Table 3 in Appendix B.
[Insert gure 3 about here]
As expected, the frequency of D-equilibria decreases as the sanction rises. Inversely, the
frequency of CE-equilibria increases with the sanction level. The largest frequency of CDE-
equilibria is found for  = 700. Beyond  = 800, the frequency of CE-equilibria rises sharply
4For illustration purposes, we added the frequencies in all the extreme cases in which the intitial population
is composed of two strategies only.
19and it becomes almost impossible for defectors to survive in the population, as shown by the
fall in the frequency of CDE- and D-equilibria. As expected from proposition 3, we also nd
blinkers in the range of relatively high sanction rates, even if the occurrence of this phenomenon
is relatively rare (see Table 3 in Appendix). Recall that for a CDE-blinker to occur, the sanction
level should be high and a single enforcer should be located between a cooperator and a defector.
In large populations this is unlikely to happen. We also nd relatively rare occurrence of cycling
CDE-equilibria. The main conclusion we can draw from these exercises is that equilibria with
cooperation have a high probability of survival.
5 Resource dynamics
The role of resource dynamics on harvesting behavior is often neglected in the literature on
common-pool issues. Experiments and games developed by Ostrom et al. (1994) do not pay
any attention to resource dynamics. In real-world situations, however, harvesters are likely to
reconsider and actually modify their strategies on the basis of observed changes in the resource
stock. Feedback eects are present from harvesting activities to the natural resource and vice
versa. Resource dynamics raises the issue of the dynamic development of the resource itself
and the impact of varying resource stock level on harvest. In addition, a new dynamic issue
is relevant in the present context, namely how resource dynamics aects the occurrence of
cooperation.
We start the analysis by postulating a logistic natural growth function :




with  the intrinsic growth rate and K the carrying capacity. Harvest is oftentimes repre-
sented by the Shaefer function where the harvest rate is eort multiplied by the resource stock.
Alternatively, it can be assumed that
F(X;N) = XN1  (17)
with 0 <  < 1: Updating of the resource stock after each round follows the usual pattern
Nt+1 = Nt + G(Nt)   F(Xt;Nt)





20We follow Sethi and Somanathan (1996) and assume that individual eort is proportional
to the existing resource stock, although there are other ways to model it, for instance with a
xed rate of harvest. We have
xH = aHN (18)
xL = aLN (19)
What is the eect of the introduction of resource dynamics on the limiting states? It is to
be expected that the qualitative nature of the limit states will not change: blinkers, cycling and
equilibria can still occur. Given that an additional global interaction mechanism is operative,
cycling is likely to become more frequent. We further expect that the likelihood of the occurrence
of CDE-equilibria will not decrease. Overharvesting as a consequence of higher eort levels in
defection does not only reduce harvesting prots per unit of eort but also through the resulting
smaller resource stock itself. Therefore, with a given eort rate of defectors, being a defector
becomes relatively less rewarding when there are many defectors. Still, the eect does not need
to be important. Actually, this is what we nd for a set of parameters that closely resemble
those used in the simulations in the absence of resource dynamics.
In the case of resource dynamics we can write:
C = aLNf(
1





nD(aH   aL) + naL




nD(aH   aL) + naL
)   wg   m

Consider D




nD(aH   aL) + naL
)   w
decrease. This is similar to the no resource dynamics case: it is a consequence of higher
eorts, given the stock. Second, the stock decreases (after some time). This also gives smaller
prots as an additional eect. The stock eect can be captured precisely by realizing that the
steady state with nD enforcers equals:
N(nD) = K(1  
(nD(aH   aL) + naL)

)
21So, the stock eect comes in in addition to the eort eect.
We run simulations with aH and aL xed such that we can compare the average frequency
of occurrence of equilibria with the no resource dynamics case. We x aL = 0:0001 and take
 = 300; K = 2  106 and  = 0:2: For the rest we employ the same parameters as before. This
yields a steady state stock of 106 if all players were cooperators or enforcers. The parameter
value aL = 0:0001 corresponds with xL = 100 in the case of no resource dynamics. Analogously,
we say that aH = 0:0002 corresponds with xH = 200 in the case without resource dynamics.
We calculate the frequency of equilibria for these parameter values for the case of resource
dynamics as well as for the case of no resource dynamics. In both cases D equilibria occur
with probability one. Similarly we performed the simulations for higher values of aH: The
results are given in Table 2.
[Insert table 2 about here]
We nd that for identical xH, resource dynamics leads to increasing occurrence of CDE-
equilibria, as expected.5
Finally, we can show that in the case of xed eort rates, the same type of results is to be
expected. With xed eort rates xL and xH we get
C = xLf(
N





nD(xH   xL) + nxL




nD(xH   xL) + nxL
)   wg   m





) = N(nD(xH   xL) + nxL)
It is not clear beforehand that this N is increasing in nD: In fact it is increasing if and only if
N
K < 1
3: For this reason the case at hand is slightly more complicated. But, under this condition,
essentially we see the same mechanism at work. Higher nD decreases aggregate prots directly
through the eort eect, and, in addition, decreases aggregate prots through its eect on the
stock. All this implies that the dierence D
k  E
m decreases when nD increases, and more than
in the absence of resource dynamics.
5With the given parameters, CE-equilibria do not occur.
226 Conclusions
This paper has studied the emergence of cooperation in a particular spatial CPR game, namely
with space modelled as a circle. The combination of evolution, space and resource leads to
a complex model system that easily dees analytical solutions. Nevertheless, various analyti-
cal results have been derived, while some insights have been supported by a large number of
numerical simulations.
The major contribution of the present paper is that in the CPR game a cooperative strategy
can survive, even when the majority of agents is defecting. This result runs counter to some of
those by Sethi and Somanathan (1996). Our nding is due to the assumption that agents base
their actions on the observations of the protability of strategies employed by neigboring agents.
In such a setting cooperators and enforcers can in some sense protect each other. By means of
several types of simulations we were able to establish support that cooperative equilibria are
likely to persist, even in stochastically changing ernvironments. Introducing resource dynamics
reenforces our results.
From a conceptual perspective, the approach adopted here can be understood as combining
local and global interactions. Virtually all related, analytical work in the literature has focused
solely on local interactions, which evidently renders much simpler model systems. The global
interactions in this case are due to two factors. First, prots are aected by aggregate harvest,
to which they all contribute. Second, prots depend on the resource stock, which changes due
to the composition of harvesting strategies in the population of agents. The presence of global
feedback means that prot rankings of strategies are not necessarly xed over time. Indeed, due
to changes in the composition of the population of strategies the aggregate harvest and resource
stock change, which in turn may alter the conditions under which the agents interact. As a
result, cycling can occur. Comparison of the cases without and with resource dynamics shows
that in the latter case cycling equilibria are more frequent, which can be understood as the
logical consequence of additional global feedback. The results obtained show that the cycles,
in this case repeatedly moving back and forth between on the one hand a high aggregate eort
and low resource state and on the other hand a low aggregate eort and high resource states
implies an increase in the frequency of cycling equilibria. The important implication is that
resource dynamics combined with spatial evolution increases the frequency of stable equilibria
in which resource use is sustainable.
The analytical results apply mainly to the case of no global interactions. The alternative
case was illustrated by a combination of analytical results, illustrative examples and systematic
numerical simulations. Evidently, future work might concentrate of extending the boundary of
analytical ndings.
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i. Since Z(nxH) > 0; it follows that 
 >  implies xHZ(X)    > xLZ(X)   
 for all
X  nxH: Hence D
1 > E
1 and, a forteriori, D
2 > E
2 :
If (xH   xL)Z(nxL) < 2   
 then xHZ(X)   2 < xLZ(X)   
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ii. If (xH   xL)Z(nxL) >    1
2
 then xHZ(X)    > xLZ(X)   1
2





1 ): Moreover, the sanction rate is relatively low.
iii. If (xH   xL)Z(nxL) <    1
2
 then xHZ(X)    < xLZ(X)   1
2





1 ): A forteriori (xH  xL)Z(X) < 2  
 for all X  nxH; so that the
sanction rate is relatively low.
iv. If (xH  xL)Z(nxL) <   
 then xHZ(X)  < xLZ(X) 
 for all X  nxH, implying
E
1 > D
1 . Then also E
2 > D
2 because  > 
:
If    2
 < (xH   xL)Z(nxH) then 0 < xHZ(X)    > xLZ(X)   2





25i. Number the positions on the circle clockwise. Put an enforcer on position 1 and, without
loss of generality, a defector on position 2.
Suppose n = 2. This is not an equilibrium because D
1 > E
1
Suppose n = 3: This case is ruled out by lemma 3iii or lemma 3iv.
Suppose n = 4: At number 3 there is a defector in view of lemma 3iv. At number 4 there is
an enforcer in view of lemma 3iii. But this cannot be an equilibrium because D
1 > E
1 :
Suppose n = 5: At number 3 there is a defector in view of lemma 3iv. At number 4 there is
an enforcer in view of lemma 3iii. At number 5 there is an enforcer because of lemma 3iv. So the
equilibrium candidate looks like: EDDEE. This is indeed an equilibrium. The defectors will
remain defectors since D
1 > E





Next we show that the minimal length of an E-cluster is equal to three. Suppose there
exists a DE equilibrium (with n  5) with only two adjacent enforcers, surrounded by defectors:




ii. Consider a CDE conguration. Put the cooperator closest to a defector on position 1.
Suppose the rst defector is at number 2. This contradicts lemma 3ii.
Suppose the rst defector is at number 3. There is an enforcer at number 2 by construction.
This cannot be an equilibrium in view of lemma 3i.
Suppose the rst defector is at number 4. There are enforcers at numbers 2 and 3 by
construction. This cannot be an equilibrium because the enforcer at number 2 will turn into a




Suppose the rst defector is at number 5. At numbers 2, 3 and 4 there are enforcers by
construction. There cannot be an enforcer at number 6 because of lemma 3iv. There cannot
be a cooperator at number 6 by construction. Hence is a defector at number 6. Because
of symmetry there are enforcers at numbers 7, 8, and 9. It is easily veried that this is an
equilibrium. Therefore the minimal number of players necessary for a CDE equilibrium is 9.
Suppose there is a CDE equilibrium with a string ED. We cannot have CED in view of
lemma 3i, nor DED (lemma 3iii). So, we have a string EED. We cannot have DEED by the
following reasoning. If the further extension could be written as DEEDD then this cannot be an
equilibrium because D
1 > E
1 , implying that the second enforcer in the row turns into a defector.
Lemma 3ii rules out the further extension DEEDC. And the extension DEEDE is not allowed
in view of lemma 3iv. Therefore, DEED cannot be part of an equilibrium. Consider, therefore,
CEED: Again the further extension cannot be CEEDD;CEEDC or CEEDE. Hence we
should have EEED. Therefore, the minimal string of enforcers is 3 if an enforcer is adjacent
to a defector.
26iii. In a blinker an enforcer will never switch to defection, for the following reason. An
enforcer next to a defector will switch to defection only if it punishes twice: with CED the






1 ): Therefore, we must have DED: But the rst defector will not switch
to enforcement since D
2 > E
2 : It follows that DE blinkers do not exist. In a CDE blinker a
cooperator will never switch to enforcement. Therefore, there should be a defector switching to
enforcement. A necessary condition is that we have EDE: But the rst enforcer will not switch
to defection.
APPENDIX B. Average frequencies of equilibria for dierent
sanction levels
[Insert table 3 about here]
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Figure 1: Frequency of equilibrium for initial shares multiple of 0.05,  = 280
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Figure 3: Average frequency of D-, CE- and CDE-equilibria for dierent sanction levels
30 D-equil. DE-equil. CE-equil. CDE-equil.
100 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.99
500 0.13 0.27 0.00 0.60
10000 0.58 0.18 0.00 0.24
20000 0.59 0.18 0.00 0.23
30000 0.56 0.22 0.00 0.22
Table 1: Percentage of time spent in each equilibrium in the presence of mutations
31With resource dynamics
xH = aHN D-equil. DE-equil. CDE-equil.
200 1.00 0.00 0.00
300 0.77 0.19 0.03
350 0.60 0.34 0.07
400 0.51 0.40 0.09
No resource dynamics
xH D-equil. DE-equil. CDE-equil.
200 1.00 0.00 0.00
300 1.00 0.00 0.00
350 0.65 0.32 0.03
400 0.55 0.39 0.07
Table 2: Average frequency of convergence with and without resource dynamics,  = 300
32sanction D-equil. DE-equil. CE-equil. CDE-equil. CDE-equil. CDE-equil. E- equil.
(blinking) (cycling)
140 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
160 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
180 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
200 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
220 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
225 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
230 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
235 0.60 0.34 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
240 0.40 0.39 0.01 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00
245 0.34 0.36 0.01 0.29 0.00 0.01 0.00
250 0.32 0.34 0.03 0.28 0.00 0.03 0.00
260 0.32 0.34 0.03 0.28 0.00 0.03 0.00
270 0.32 0.35 0.03 0.28 0.00 0.03 0.00
280 0.32 0.33 0.04 0.29 0.00 0.02 0.01
290 0.32 0.33 0.04 0.29 0.00 0.02 0.01
300 0.32 0.33 0.04 0.29 0.00 0.02 0.01
310 0.31 0.33 0.04 0.29 0.00 0.02 0.01
320 0.32 0.33 0.04 0.29 0.00 0.02 0.01
350 0.30 0.34 0.04 0.29 0.00 0.02 0.01
360 0.30 0.33 0.04 0.30 0.00 0.02 0.01
370 0.30 0.34 0.04 0.30 0.00 0.02 0.01
500 0.12 0.34 0.06 0.45 0.01 0.01 0.01
700 0.10 0.44 0.07 0.33 0.02 0.01 0.02
750 0.09 0.45 0.07 0.33 0.03 0.01 0.02
800 0.00 0.01 0.78 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.20
900 0.00 0.00 0.78 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.21
Table 3: Average frequency of convergence for dierent sanction levels
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